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Abstract
In the lowest unique positive integer (LUPI) game, players pick positive integers and the
player who chose the lowest unique number (not chosen by anyone else) wins a xed
prize. We derive theoretical equilibrium predictions, assuming fully rational players with
Poisson-distributed uncertainty about the number of players. We also derive predictions
for boundedly rational players using quantal response equilibrium and a cognitive hier-
archy of rationality steps with quantal responses. The theoretical predictions are tested
using both eld data from a Swedish gambling company, and laboratory data from a
scaled-down version of the eld game. The eld and lab data show similar patterns: in
early rounds, players choose very low and very high numbers too often, and avoid focal
(round) numbers. However, there is some learning and a surprising degree of conver-
gence toward equilibrium. The cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses can
account for the basic discrepancies between the equilibrium prediction and the data.
jel classification: C72, C92, L83, C93.
keywords: Population uncertainty, Poisson game, QRE, congestion game, guessing
game, experimental methods, behavioral game theory, cognitive hierarchy.
1 Introduction
In early 2007, a Swedish gambling company introduced a simple lottery. In the lottery,
players simultaneously choose positive integers from 1 to K. The winner is the player
who chooses the lowest number that nobody else picked. We call this the LUPI game1,
because the lowest unique positive integer wins. This paper analyzes LUPI theoretically
and reports data from the Swedish eld experience and from parallel lab experiments.
LUPI is not an exact model of anything in the political economy, but it combines
strategic features of other important naturally-occurring games. For example, in games
with congestion, a players payo¤s are lower if others choose the same strategy. Examples
include choices of tra¢ c routes and research topics, or buyers and sellers choosing among
multiple markets. LUPI has the property of an extreme congestion game, in which having
even one other player choose the same number reduces ones payo¤to zero. However, LUPI
is not a congestion game as dened by Rosenthal (1973) since the payo¤ from choosing
a particular number does not only depend on how many other players that picked that
number, but also on how many that picked lower numbers.
The closest analogues to LUPI in the economy are unique bid auctions (see the ongoing
research by Eichberger and Vinogradov, 2007, Raviv and Virag, 2007 and Rapoport,
Otsubo, Kim, and Stein, 2007). In these auctions, an object is sold either to the lowest
bidder whose bid is unique, or in some versions of the auction to the highest unique bid.
LUPI di¤ers from these auctions in that players dont have to pay their bid if they win and
also avoids complications resulting from private valuations. LUPI focuses on the essential
strategic conict: players want to choose low numbers, in order to be the lowest, but also
want to avoid numbers others will choose, in order to be unique.
While LUPI is an articial game that was not designed to model a familiar economic
situation, it is interesting to study for several reasons.
First, since game-theoretic reasoning is generally hoped to apply universally across
many classes of games, studying its application in an articial game (where predictions
are clear and bold) is scientically useful. And since the number of players who participate
in the Swedish lottery is not xed, analyzing the LUPI game presents an opportunity to
empirically test theory in which the number of players is Poisson-distributed (Myerson,
1998) for the rst time.2
Second, the clear structure of the Swedish LUPI lottery allows us to create a parallel
lab experiment. This parallelism provides a rare opportunity to see whether an experiment
1The Swedish company called the game Limbo, but we think LUPI is more apt and mnemonic.
2This also distinguishes our paper from the research on unique bid auctions by Eichberger and Vino-
gradov (2007), Raviv and Virag (2007) and Rapoport, Otsubo, Kim, and Stein (2007) which all assume
that the number of players is xed and commonly known.
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deliberately designed to replicate the empirical regularities observed in a particular eld
setting can lead to comparable ndings. The eld and lab conclusions are very similar.
The strengths of each of the lab and eld methods also compensate for weaknesses in the
other method. In the eld data, there is no way of knowing if the assumption that the
number of players is Poisson-distributed is plausible, whether there is collusion, and how
individual players di¤er and learn. All these concerns can be controlled for or measured
in the lab. In the lab, it is expensive to produce a large sample; there is substantially
more data from the eld (more than two million choices).
Third, the simple structure of the LUPI game means it is possible to compare Poisson-
equilibrium predictions with precise predictions of two parametric models of boundedly
rational play quantal response equilibrium, and a level-k cognitive hierarchy approach.
The eld and lab choices are reasonably close to those predicted by equilibrium. However,
players typically choose more low and high numbers than predicted, and the cognitive
hierarchy approach can account for those deviations.
The next section provides a theoretical analysis of a simple form of the LUPI game,
including the (symmetric) Poisson-Nash equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium and
cognitive hierarchy behavioral models. Section 3 and 4 analyze the data from the eld
and the lab, respectively. Section 5 discusses the issues concerning eld vs. lab, and
section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Theory
In the simplest form of LUPI, the number of players, N , has a known distribution, the
players choose integers from 1 to K simultaneously, and the lowest unique number wins.
The winner earns a payo¤ of 1, while all others earn 0.3
Werst analyze the game when players are assumed to be fully rational, best-responding,
and have equilibrium beliefs. We focus on symmetric equilibria since players both in the
eld and lab are generally anonymous to each other. We also assume the number of
players is a random variable that has a Poisson distribution, which is a plausible ap-
proximation (and can be exactly implemented in the lab) and much easier to work with
analytically.4 Appendix A and B discusses the xed-n equilibrium and why it is so much
3In this stylized case, we assume that if there is no lowest unique number there is no winner. This
simplies the analysis because it means that only the probability of being unique must be computed. In
the Swedish game, if there is no unique number then the players who picked the least-frequently-chosen
number share the top prize. This is just one of many small di¤erences between the simplied game
analyzed in this section and the game as played in the eld, which are discussed further below.
4Players did not know the number of total bets in both the eld and lab versions of the LUPI game.
Although players in the eld could get information about the current number of bets that had been
made so far during the day, players had to place their bets before the game closed for the day and could
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more di¢ cult to compute than the Poisson-Nash equilibrium. We then discuss the quan-
tal response equilibrium (QRE), and predictions from a cognitive hierarchy model with
quantal response.
2.1 Properties of Poisson Games
In this section, we briey summarize the theory of Poisson games developed by Myerson
(1998, 2000), which is then used in the next section to characterize the Poisson-Nash
equilibrium in the LUPI game.
Games with population uncertainty relax the assumption that the exact number of
players is common knowledge. In particular, in a Poisson game the number of players N
is a random variable that follows a Poisson distribution with mean n. We have
N  Poisson(n) : N = k with probability e
 nnk
k!
and, in the case of a Bayesian game, playerstypes are independently determined according
to the probability distribution r = (r(t))t2T on some type space T . Let a type prole be
a vector of non-negative integers listing the number of players of each type t in T , and let
Z (T ) be the set of all such type proles in the game. Combining N and r can describe
the population uncertainty with the distribution y  Q(y) where y 2 Z (T ) and y(t) is
the number of players of type t 2 T .
Players have a common nite action space C with at least two alternatives, which
generates an action prole Z(C) containing the number of players that choose each action.
Utility is a bounded function U : Z(C)  C  T ! R, where U(x; b; t) is the payo¤ of a
player with type t, choosing action b, and facing an opponent action prole of x. Let x(c)
denote the number of other players playing action c 2 C.
Myerson (1998) shows that the Poisson distribution has two important properties that
are relevant for Poisson games and simplify computations dramatically. The rst is the
decomposition property, which in the case of Poisson games imply that the distribution of
type proles for any y 2 Z (T ) is given by
Q(y) =
Y
t2T
e nr(t)(nr(t))y(t)
y(t)!
:
Hence, ~Y (t), the random number of players of type t 2 T , is Poisson with mean nr(t), and
is independent of ~Y (t0) for any other t0 2 T . Moreover, suppose each player independently
plays the mixed strategy , choosing action c 2 C with probability (cjt) given his type t.
therefore not know with certainty the total number of players that would participate in that day.
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Then, by the decomposition property, the number of players of type t that chooses action
c, Y (c; t), is Poisson with mean nr(t)(cjt) and is independent of Y (c0; t0) for any other
c0; t0.
The second property of Poisson distributions is the aggregation property which states
that any sum of independent Poisson random variables is Poisson distributed. This prop-
erty implies that the number of players (across all types) who choose action c, ~X(c), is
Poisson with mean
P
t2T nr(t)(cjt), independent of ~X(c0) for any other c0 2 C. We refer
to this property of Poisson games as the independent actions (IA) property.
Myerson (1998) also shows that the Poisson game has another useful property: envi-
ronmental equivalence (EE). Environmental equivalence means that conditional on being
in the game, a type t player would perceive the population uncertainty as an outsider
would, i.e., Q(y).5 If the strategy and type spaces are nite, Poisson games are the only
games with population uncertainty that satisfy both IA and EE (Myerson, 1998).
A (symmetric) equilibrium for the Poisson game is dened as a strategy function  such
that every type assigns positive probability only to actions that maximize the expected
utility for players of this type; that is, for every action c 2 C and every type t 2 T ,
if (cjt) > 0 then U(cjt; ) = max
b2C
U(bjt; )
for the expected utility
U(bjs; ) =
X
x2Z(C)
Y
c2C

e n(c)(n(c))x(c)
x(c)!

U(x; b; s)
where
(c) =
X
t2T
r(t)(cjt)
is the marginal probability that a random sampled player will choose action c under .
Myerson (1998) proves existence of equilibrium under all games of population uncer-
tainty with nite action and type spaces, which includes the Poisson game.6 Note that the
equilibria in games with population uncertainty must be symmetric in the sense that each
type plays the same strategy. This existence result provides the basis for the following
characterization of the Poisson-Nash equilibrium and the cognitive hierarchy model with
quantal responses.
5In particular, for a Poisson game, the number of opponents he faces is also a random variable of
Poisson(n).
6For innite types, Myerson (2000) proves existence of equilibrium for Poisson games alone.
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2.2 Poisson-Nash Equilibrium for the LUPI Game
In the symmetric Poisson-Nash equilibrium, all players employ the same mixed strategy
p = (p1; p2;    ; pK) where
PK
i=1 pi = 1. Let the random variable X(k) be the number of
players who pick k in equilibrium. Then, Pr(X(k) = i) is the probability that the number
of players who pick k in equilibrium is i. By environmental equivalence, Pr(X(k) = i)
would also be the probability that i opponents pick k. Hence, the expected payo¤s for
choosing di¤erent numbers are:7
(1) = Pr(X(1) = 0) = e np1
(2) = Pr(X(1) 6= 1)  Pr(X(2) = 0)
(3) = Pr(X(1) 6= 1)  Pr(X(2) 6= 1)  Pr(X(3) = 0)
...
(k) =
k 1Y
i=1
Pr(X(i) 6= 1)  Pr(X(k) = 0)
=
k 1Y
i=1

1  npie npi
  e npk
for all k > 1. If both k and k+1 are chosen with positive probability in equilibrium, then
(k) = (k + 1). Rearranging this equilibrium condition implies
enpk+1 = enpk   npk: (1)
In addition to this condition, the probabilities must sum up to one and the expected
payo¤ from playing numbers not in the support of the equilibrium strategy cannot be
higher than the numbers played with positive probability.
The three equilibrium conditions allows us to characterize the equilibrium and show
that it is unique.
Proposition 1 There is a unique equilibrium p = (p1; p2;    ; pK) of the Poisson LUPI
game that satises the following properties:
1. Full support: pk > 0 for all k.
2. Decreasing probabilities: pk+1 < pk for all k.
3. Convexity/concavity: (pk   pk+1) is increasing in k for pk < 1=n and decreasing in
k for pk > 1=n.
7Recall that winners payo¤ is normalized to 1, and others are 0.
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4. Convergence to uniform play: for any xed K, n!1 implies pk+1 ! pk.
Proof. We rst prove the four properties and then prove that the equilibrium is
unique.
1. We prove this property by induction. For k = 1, we must have p1 > 0. Otherwise,
deviating from the proposed equilibrium by choosing 1 would guarantee winning for
sure. Now suppose that there is some number k+1 that is not played in equilibrium,
but that k is played with positive probability. We show that  (k + 1) >  (k),
implying that this cannot be an equilibrium. To see this, note that the expressions
for the expected payo¤s allows us to write the ratio  (k + 1) = (k) as
 (k + 1)
 (k)
=
Qk
i=1 Pr(X(i) 6= 1)  Pr(X(k + 1) = 0)Qk 1
i=1 Pr(X(i) 6= 1)  Pr(X(k) = 0)
=
Pr(X(k) 6= 1)  Pr(X(k + 1) = 0)
Pr(X(k) = 0)
:
If k+1 is not used in equilibrium, Pr(X(k+1) = 0) = 1, implying that the ratio is
above one. This shows that all integers between 1 and K are played with positive
probability in equilibrium.
2. Rewrite equation (1) as
enpk+1   enpk =  npk:
By the rst property, both pk and pk+1 are positive, so that the right hand side is
negative. Since the exponential is an increasing function, we conclude that pk >
pk+1.
3. First rearrange equation (1) as
pk+1 = pk +
1
n
ln
 
1  npke npk

: (2)
We want to determine (pk   pk+1) = (pk+1   pk+2). Using (2) we can write this ratio
as
pk   pk+1
pk+1   pk+2 =
ln (1  npke npk)
ln (1  npk+1e npk+1) =
ln (Pr(X(k) 6= 1))
ln (Pr(X(k + 1) 6= 1)) :
The derivative of Pr(X(k) 6= 1) with respect to pk is positive if pk > 1=n and
negative if pk < 1=n. We therefore have shown that (pk   pk+1) is increasing in k
when pk > 1=n, whereas the di¤erence is decreasing for pk > 1=n.
4. Taking the limit of (2) as n!1 implies that pk+1 = pk.
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In order to show that the equilibrium p = (p1; p2;    ; pK) is unique, suppose by con-
tradiction that there is another equilibrium p0 = (p01; p
0
2;    ; p0K). By the equilibrium
condition (1), p1 uniquely determines all probabilities p2; :::; pK , while p01 uniquely deter-
mines p02; :::; p
0
K . Without loss of generality, we assume p
0
1 > p1. Since in any equilibrium,
pk+1 is strictly increasing in pk by condition (1), it must be the case that all positive
probabilities in p0 are higher than in p. However, since p is an equilibrium,
PK
k=1pk = 1.
This means that
PK
k=1p
0
k > 1, contradicting the assumption that p
0 is an equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
To illustrate these equilibrium properties, here are the probabilities of choosing num-
bers 1 to K (columns) for various games with the Poisson mean N equal to the highest
number K, for 3 to 8 players:
3x3 4x4 5x5 6x6 7x7 8x8
1 0:4773 0:4057 0:3589 0:3244 0:2971 0:2747
2 0:3378 0:3092 0:2881 0:2701 0:2541 0:2397
3 0:1849 0:1980 0:2046 0:2057 0:2030 0:1983
4 0:0870 0:1129 0:1315 0:1430 0:1492
5 0:0355 0:0575 0:0775 0:0931
6 0:0108 0:0234 0:0385
7 0:0020 0:0064
8 0:0002
In the Swedish game the average number of players was N = 53; 783 and number
choices were positive integers up to K = 99; 999. As Figure 1 shows, the equilibrium
involves mixing with substantial probability between 1 and 5000, starting from p1 =
0:0002025. The predicted probabilities drop o¤ very sharply at around 5513. Note that
all numbers are chosen with positive probability in equilibrium, but Figure 1 shows only
the predicted probabilities for 1 to 10,000, since probabilities for number chosen above
10,000 are minuscule.
The central empirical question that will be answered later is how well actual behavior in
the eld matches the equilibrium prediction in Figure 1. Keep in mind that the simplied
game analyzed in this section di¤ers in some potentially important ways from the actual
Swedish game. Computing the equilibrium is extremely complicated and its shape is not
intuitive. It would therefore be surprising if the actual data matched the equilibrium
closely.
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2.3 Logit QRE
As described in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and Chen, Friedman, and Thisse (1997),
the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) replaces best responses by quantal responses,
allowing for either error in actions or uncertainty about payo¤s. In a logit QRE, a vector
p = (p1; p2;    ; pK) is a symmetric equilibrium if all probabilities satisfy
pk =
exp ((k))PK
j=1 exp ((j))
;
where payo¤s are expected payo¤s given the equilibrium probabilities.
If we assume that the number of players are Poisson distributed, we can use the
expression for the payo¤ from playing the kth number from the previous section. This
gives the following symmetric QRE probabilities of the game:
pk =
exp


Qk 1
i=1 [1  npie npi ] e npk

PK
j=1 exp


Qj 1
i=1 [1  npie npi ] e npj
 :
Note that in a logit QRE, as in the Poisson equilibrium, all numbers are played with
positive probability.
The ratio between pk+1 and pk is
pk+1
pk
=
exp


Qk
i=1 [1  npie npi ] e npk+1

exp


Qk 1
i=1 [1  npie npi ] e npk

= exp
 

k 1Y
i=1

1  npie npi
  
1  npke npk

e npk+1   e npk! :
In the logit QRE, the equilibrium probabilities satisfy pk  pk+1 with strict inequality
whenever  > 0 (when  = 0 all strategies are played with equal probability 1=K).8
8To see why this is the case, suppose by contradiction that pk+1 > pk, i.e., pk+1=pk > 1. From the
expression for the ratio pk+1=pk we know that this implies that 

k 1Y
i=1

1  npie npi
  
1  npke npk

e npk+1   e npk! > 0:
Dividing by  (assuming that  > 0) and the multiplicative operator and rearranging we get 
1  npke npk

enpk > enpk+1 :
Taking logarithms
1
n
ln
 
1  npke npk

> pk+1   pk:
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Some intuition about how QRE behaves9 can be obtained from the case implemented
in the lab experiments, which has an average of N = 26:9 players (Poisson-distributed)
and numbers from 1 to K = 99. Figure 2 shows the QRE probability distributions for
three values of  and for the Poisson-Nash equilibrium. When  is low, the distribution
is approximately uniform. As  increases more probability is placed on lower numbers 1-
10. When  is high enough the QRE closely approximates the Poisson-Nash equilibrium,
which puts roughly linear declining weight on numbers 1 to 15 and innitesimal weight
on higher numbers.
2.4 Cognitive Hierarchy with Quantal Response
A natural way to model limits on strategic thinking is by assuming that di¤erent players
carry out di¤erent numbers of steps of iterated strategic thinking in a cognitive hierarchy
(CH). This idea has been developed in behavioral game theory by several authors (e.g.,
Nagel, 1995, Stahl and Wilson, 1995, Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta, 2001 and
Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2004) applied to many games of di¤erent structures (Camerer,
Ho, and Chong, 2004). A precursor to these models was the insight, developed much
earlier in the 1980s by researchers studying negotiation, that people often ignore the
cognitions of others in asymmetric-information bidding and negotiation games (Bazer-
man, Curhan, Moore, and Valley, 2000).
These models require a specication of how k-step players behave and the proportions
of players for various k. We follow Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) and assume that the
proportion of players that do k thinking steps is Poisson distributed with mean  , i.e.,
the proportion of players that think in k steps is given by
f (k) = e  k=k!:
We assume that k-step thinkers correctly guess the proportions of players doing 0 to k 1
steps. Then the conditional density function for the belief of a k-step thinker about the
proportion of l < k step thinkers is
gk (l) =
f (l)Pk 1
h=0 f (h)
:
The IA and EE properties of Poisson games imply that the number of players that a
Since pk+1 > pk, the right hand side is positive. The left hand side, however, is always negative since
1   npke npk = P (X (k) 6= 1) (which is a probability between zero and one). This is a contradiction,
and we can therefore conclude that pk > pk+1 whenever  > 0.
9We have not shown that the symmetric logit QRE is unique, but no other symmetric equilibria have
emerged during numerical calculations.
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k-step thinker believes will play strategy i is Poisson distributed with mean
nqki = n
k 1X
j=0
gk (j) p
j
i .
Hence, the expected payo¤ for a k-step thinker of choosing number i is
k(i) =
i 1Y
j=1
h
1  nqkj e nq
k
j
i
 e nqki :
To t the data well, it is necessary to assume that players respond stochastically (as in
QRE) rather than always choose best responses (see also Camerer, Palfrey, and Rogers,
2006).10 We assume that level 0 players randomize uniformly across all numbers 1 to K,
and higher-step players best respond with probabilities determined by a power function.11
The probability that a k step player plays number i is given by
pki =
Qi 1
j=1
h
1  nqkj e nq
k
j
i
e nq
k
i

PK
l=1
Qi 1
j=1
h
1  nqkj e nq
k
j
i
e nql
 ;
for  > 0. In order for probabilities to be increasing in the payo¤ of a number, the
payo¤s have to be non-negative, which is the case in the LUPI game. Since qkj is de-
ned recursively it only depends of what lower step thinkers do it is straightforward
to compute the outcome numerically. Apart from the number of players and the numbers
of strategies, there are two parameters: the average number of thinking steps,  , and the
precision parameter, .
To illustrate how the CH model behaves, consider the parameters of our lab experi-
ments, in which N = 26:9 and K = 99, with  = 1:5 and  = 2. Figure 3 shows how 0 to
5 step thinkers play LUPI and the predicted aggregate frequency, summing across the dif-
ferent thinking step distributions. In this example, one-step thinkers put most probability
10The reason why quantal response is empirically helpful is that best-response models pile up predicted
responses at a very small range of the lowest integers, which does not match the data when the number
range is large. That is, if k-step thinkers choose best responses and there are many players, a one-step
thinker always chooses 1. A two-step thinker anticipates that others will randomize or choose 1, so she
chooses 2. In games where the number range is large, this best-response CH approach predicts number
choices will be highly clustered at only the rst few integers. Assuming quantal response smoothes out
the predicted choices over a wider number range.
11A logit choice function ts substantially worse in this case. Note that the logit form implies invariance
of choice probabilities to adding a constant to all payo¤s, while the power form implies invariance to
multiplying payo¤s by a positive number. The fact that selected and unselected players in the lab
experiment playing for money and pride, respectively, behave similarly is consistent with the power
function implication that changing stake in scale does not matter much, assuming that there is some
intrinsic payo¤ even when there is no money payo¤.
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on number 1, whereas two-step thinkers put most probability on number 5. Three-step
thinkers put most probability on numbers 3 and 7. (Remarkably, these predictions put
more overall weight on odd numbers, which is evident in the eld data too.)
Figure 4 shows the prediction of the cognitive hierarchy model for the parameters of the
eld LUPI game, i.e., when N = 53; 783 and K = 99; 999. The dashed line corresponds
to the case when players do relatively few steps of reasoning and their responses are very
noisy ( = 3 and  = 0:008). The dotted line corresponds to the case when players do
more steps of reasoning and respond more precisely ( = 10 and  = 0:011).
There is an important contrast between the ways in which QRE and CHmodels deviate
from equilibrium. QRE predicts number choices will be more evenly spread across the
entire range than what equilibrium predicts; i.e., there will be too few low numbers and
too many higher numbers. As Figure 4 shows, when compared to Poisson equilibrium,
CH predicts there will be too many very low numbers, not enough numbers at the high
end (e.g. 3000 to 5518 in Figure 4, when  and  are low, and 4500 to 5518 when  and
 are high).
3 The Field LUPI Game
The eld version of LUPI called Limbo, was introduced by the Swedish government-owned
gambling monopoly Svenska Spel on the 29th of January 2007.12 This section describes
its essential elements with additional description in Appendix C.
In Limbo, players chose up to six integers between 1 and 99,999, and each number bet
costs 10 SEK each (approximately 1 EURO). The game was played daily and the winning
number was presented on TV in the evening and on the Internet. The winner received
18 percent of the total sum of bets, with the prize guaranteed to be at least 100,000 SEK
(approximately 10,000 EURO).13 In the unlikely event that there is no number that only
one player picked, which never happened, the prize would have been split between those
who chose the lowest number with the fewest number of bets. There were also second
and third prizes, as well as a special weekly nal prize. The second prize was 1000 SEK
and was received by everyone who chose numbers that were close (below or above) to the
winning number. The third prize was 20 SEK and was received by everyone who chose
numbers close to the winning number, but not close enough to win the second prize.14
12Stefan Molin at Svenska Spel told us that he invented the game in 2001 after taking a game theory
course from the Swedish theorist and experimenter Martin Dufwenberg.
13The prize guarantee of 100,000 SEK was rst extended until the 11th of March and then to the 18th
of March. We use data from the 29th of January to the 18th of March, so the prize guarantee covered
all days for which we have data.
14The thresholds for the second and third prizes were determined so that the second prizes constituted
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The winner of the rst prize also won the possibility to participate in a nal game.15
The nal game ran weekly and had four to seven participants. The nal gameconsisted
of three rounds where the participants chose two numbers in each round. The rules of
this game were very similar to the original game, but what happened in this game did not
depend on what number you chose in the main game, so we leave out the details about
this game.
During the rst three to four weeks, it was only possible to play the game at physical
branches of Svenska Spel. Players had to ll out the form shown in Figure A1 when
playing at physical branches. The form allowed players to bet on up to six numbers,
and it also allowed players to play the same numbers for up to 7 days in a row. More
importantly, there was also an option called HuxFlux, which indicated that the player
wanted a computer to select a number. The computer selected numbers from a uniform
distribution where the support of the distribution was determined by the play during the
7 previous days.16 It became possible to play the game on the Internet sometime between
the 21st and 26th of February 2007. The web interface for online play is shown in Figure
A2. This interface also included the option HuxFlux, but in this case players could see
the number that was generated by the computer before deciding whether to place the bet.
We use daily data from the rst seven weeks. The reason is that the game was
withdrawn from the market on the 24th of March 2007 and we were only able to access
data up to the 18th of March 2007. The game was stopped one day after a newspaper
article claimed that some players had colluded in the game, but it is unclear to what extent
collusion actually occurred.17 Unfortunately, we have only gained access to aggregate daily
frequencies, not to individual data. The data used includes choices from players that let
a random number generator pick an integer for them.18
Note that the theoretical analysis of the LUPI game di¤ers from the eld LUPI game
11 percent of all bets and the third prizes 17.5 percent.
153.5 percent of all daily bets were reserved for this nal game.
16In the rst week HuxFlux randomized numbers uniformly between 1 and 15000. After seven days of
play, the computer randomized uniformly between 1 and the average 90th percentile from the previous
seven days. However, the only information given to players about HuxFlux was that a computer would
choose a number for them.
17The rule that players could only pick up to six numbers a day was enforced by the requirement that
players had to use a gamblers card linked to their personal identication number when they played.
Colluding in LUPI can increase the probability of winning. For example, in the eld data we obtained,
the lowest number not played was always below 4800, meaning that a coalition consisting 800 people
each choosing 6 distinctive numbers could guarantee a win facing the empirical distribution of bets in
any given day. The total payo¤ for the coalition would be at least 100; 000   48; 000 = 52; 000 (SEK).
Note this requires a large number of people to work, and will fail miserably if more than one coalition
act on the same day.
18We dont know exactly how many players used this option. However, in the rst week, we can infer
that the number of players choosing this option was approximately 19 percent. (Since we know the upper
cuto¤ for the randomizing device, we use the number of bets above and below this cuto¤ to get this
approximation.)
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in three respects. First, in the theoretical analysis we assume a tie-breaking rule such
that nobody gets anything if there is no unique number. In the eld version of LUPI, the
prize is split between those that guessed the lowest number with the fewest number of
guesses. Since the probability that there is no number that only one player guessed is very
small when the number of players and numbers to choose from are large, we believe that
this di¤erence plays little role for the theoretical predictions. A second, more important,
di¤erence is that we assume that each player can only pick one number. In the eld
game, players are allowed to bet on up to six numbers. This does play a role for the
theoretical predictions, since it allows players to knock outa winner by choosing the
same number twice and then bet on a higher number hoping that this will be the only
winning number. However, this di¤erence is less likely to play a role when the number of
players is very large, as it is in our eld data. Finally, we do not take the second and third
prizes present in the eld version into account, but this is unlikely to make a big di¤erence
for the strategic nature of the game. Nevertheless, these three di¤erences between the
game analyzed theoretically and the eld game is an important motivation for why we
also run laboratory experiments with single bets, no opportunity for direct collusion, and
only a rst prize, which match the game analyzed theoretically.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the rst 49 days of the game. To get some notion
of possible learning over time, two additional columns display the corresponding daily
averages for the rst and last weeks. The last column displays the corresponding statistics
that would result if players played according to Poisson-Nash equilibrium.
Overall, the average number of bets was 53,783, but there was considerable variation
over time. There is no apparent time trend in the number of participating players, but
there is less participation on Sundays and Mondays (see Figure A3). The variation of the
number of bets across days is therefore much higher than what the Poisson distribution
predicts (its standard deviation is 232), which is one more reason to expect the equilibrium
prediction to not t very well.
However, the average number chosen overall was 2835, which is close to the equilibrium
prediction of 2595. Winning numbers, and the lowest numbers not chosen by anyone, also
varied a lot over time. Comparing the rst and last week, all the aggregate statistics
and frequencies in low-number intervals converge reasonably closely to equilibrium. For
example, in equilibrium essentially nobody should choose a number above 10,000. In the
rst week 12 percent chose these high numbers, but that fraction fell to one percent in
the last week.
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All days 1st week 7th week Eq.
Avg. Std. Min Max Avg. Avg. Avg.
# Bets 53783 7782 38933 69830 57017 47907 53783
Average number played 2835 813 2168 6752 4512 2484 2595
Median number played 1674 348 435 2272 1203 1935 2541
Winning number 2095 1266 162 4465 1159 1982 2585
Lowest number not played 3103 929 480 4597 1745 3462 4077
Below 100 (%) 6.08 4.84 2.72 2.97 15.16 3.19 2.02
Below 1000 (%) 32.31 8.14 21.68 63.32 44.91 27.52 20.05
Below 5000 (%) 92.52 6.44 68.26 97.74 78.75 96.44 93.34
Below 10000 (%) 96.63 3.80 80.70 98.94 88.07 98.81 100.00
Even numbers (%) 46.75 0.58 45.05 48.06 45.91 47.45 49.99
Divisible by 10 (%) 8.54 0.466 7.61 9.81 8.43 9.01 9.99
Proportion 19002010 (%) 71.61 4.28 67.33 87.01 7.94 68.79 49.78
11, 22, etc. (%) 12.2 0.82 10.8 14.4 12.4 11.4 9.00
111, 222 etc. (%) 3.48 0.65 2.48 4.70 4.27 2.78 0.90
1111, 2222, etc. () 4.52 0.73 2.81 5.80 4.74 3.95 0.74
11111, 22222, etc. () 0.76 0.84 0.15 5.45 2.26 0.21 0
Proportion of numbers between 1900 and 2010 refers to the proportion relative to numbers between
1844 and 2066. "11, 22, etc" refers to the proportion relative to numbers below 100, "111,222, etc"
relative to numbers below 1000 and so on. The prediction refers to the equilibrium with n = 53; 783 and
K = 99; 999:
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for eld data
An interesting feature of the data is a tendency to avoid round or focal numbers and
choose quirky numbers that are perceived as anti-focal(as in hide-and-seek games, see
Crawford and Iriberri, 2007). Even numbers were chosen less often than odd ones (46.75%
vs. 53.25%). Numbers divisible by 10 are chosen a little less often than predicted. Strings
of repeating digits (like 1111) are chosen too often.19 Players also overchoose numbers that
represent years in modern time (perhaps their birth years), except for round years (e.g.,
1950). If players had played according to equilibrium, the fraction of numbers between
1900 and 2010 divided by all numbers between 1844 and 2066 should be 49.78 percent,
but the actual fraction was 70 percent. Figure 5 shows a histogram of numbers between
1900 and 2010 (aggregating all 49 days). Note that although the numbers around 1950
are most popular, there are dips at years that are divisible by ten. Figure 5 also shows
the aggregate distribution of numbers between 1550 and 2400, which clearly shows the
popularity of numbers around 1950 and 2007. There are also spikes in the data for special
19Similar behavior can be found in the federal tax evasion case of Joe Francis, the founder of Girls
Gone Wild.Mr. Francis was indicted on April 11, 2007 for claiming false business expenses such as
$333,333.33 and $1,666,666.67 in insurance, which were too suspicious not to attract attention. See
http://consumerist.com/consumer/taxes/girls-gone-wild-tax-indictment-teaches-us-not-to-
deduct-funny+looking-numbers-252097.php for the proposed tax lesson.
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numbers like 2121, 2222 and 2345.
3.2 Results
Do subjects in the eld LUPI game play according to the equilibrium prediction? In order
to investigate this, we assume that the number of players is Poisson distributed with mean
equal to the empirical daily average number of numbers chosen (53783). As noted, this
assumption is wrong because the variation in number of bets across days is much higher
than what the Poisson distribution predicts.
Recall that in the Poisson equilibrium, probabilities of choosing higher numbers rst
decrease slowly, drop quite sharply at around 5500, and asymptotes to zero after p5513 
1=n (recall Proposition 1 and Figure 1). Figure 6 shows the average daily frequencies from
the rst week together with the equilibrium prediction (indicated by the dashed line), for
all numbers up to 100,000 and for the restricted interval up to 10,000. Compared to
equilibrium, there is overshooting at numbers below 1000 and undershooting at numbers
between between 2000 and 5500. It is also noteworthy how spiky the data is compared
to the equilibrium prediction, which is a reection of clustering on special numbers, as
described above.
Figure 7 shows average daily frequencies of choices from the second through the last
(7th) week. Behavior in this period is much closer to equilibrium than in the rst week.
Indeed, when the full range of numbers is graphed (the left-hand graph) it is clear that
there are too many low choices, but the frequencies do drop o¤ sharply quite close to
where the equilibrium predicts a dropo¤. However, when only numbers below 10,000 are
plotted, the overshooting of low numbers and undershooting of intermediate numbers is
still clear and there are still many spikes of clustered choices. (These two deviations are
still evident even in the seventh and last week, as shown in Figure A4.)
Statistical tests of the signicance of these deviations are unnecessary because the large
sample sizes will reject the equilibrium hypothesis strongly. The more important question
is whether alternative theories can explain both the degree to which the equilibrium
prediction is surprisingly accurate and the degree to which there is systematic deviation.
3.3 Rationalizing Non-Equilibrium Play
In this section, we investigate if the cognitive hierarchy model can account for the two main
deviations from equilibrium just described in the previous section. We do not estimate
the QRE model because it cannot account for overshooting of low numbers, and it is very
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computationally challenging to estimate for the large-scale eld data. (We do estimate it
for the lab data discussed later.)
Table 2 reports the results from the maximum likelihood estimation of the data using
the cognitive hierarchy model.20 The best-tting estimates week-by-week, shown in Table
2, suggest that both parameters increase over time. The average number of thinking steps
that people carry out,  , increases from about 3 in the rst week an estimate reasonably
close to estimates from 1.5 to 2.5 that typical t experimental data sets well (Camerer,
Ho, and Chong, 2004) to 10 in the last week.
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 2.9777 5.8338 7.3156 7.208 7.8175 10.2672 10.2672
 0.0080 0.0094 0.0103 0.0108 0.0110 0.0108 0.0107
Table 2: Maximum likelihood estimation of the cognitive hierarchy model for eld data
Figure 8 shows the average daily frequencies from the rst week together with the
cognitive hierarchy estimation and equilibrium prediction. The cognitive hierarchy model
does a reasonable job of accounting for the over- and undershooting tendencies at low and
intermediate numbers. The model also accounts for the fact that some players pick very
high numbers (which any model with extra randomness will do). For the rst week, the
cognitive hierarchy model predicts that 5 percent of all numbers are above 10,000, which
is too low since the corresponding number in data from the rst week is 12 percent, but is
closer than the equilibrium prediction of approximately zero. Furthermore, while the CH
model does have two degrees of freedom which the Poisson equilibrium prediction does
not, there is a large amount of data so the good account of the deviations is not due to
overtting.
In the last week, the estimated  and  both are considerably higher. As a result,
the cognitive hierarchy prediction is much closer to equilibrium but still accounts for the
smaller over- and undershooting (see Figure 9).
To get some notion of how close to the data the tted cognitive hierarchy model is,
Table 3 displays two goodness-of-t statistics. The log-likelihoods reveal that the cognitive
hierarchy model does better in explaining the data toward the last week. (Likelihoods of
the Poisson-Nash equilibrium are an unfair test because many numbers are chosen that
have essentially zero predicted probability; likelihood comparisons like the Vuong test
would therefore very strongly reject the equilibrium prediction.)
In order to compare the CH model with the equilibrium prediction, we calculate the
20It is di¢ cult to guarantee that these estimates are global maxima since the likelihood function is
not smooth and concave. We also used a relatively coarse grid search, so there may be other parameter
values that yield higher likelihoods.
16
proportion of the empirical density that lies below the predicted density, i.e., the propor-
tion of choices that were correctly predicted. This statistic also shows that the cognitive
hierarchy model can explain the data better toward the end of the time period. The
cognitive hierarchy model does better than the equilibrium prediction in all seven weeks
based on this statistic. For example, in the rst week, 61 percent of playerschoices were
consistent with the cognitive hierarchy model, whereas only 50 percent were consistent
with equilibrium. However, the cognitive hierarchy model is tted with two free para-
meters, whereas the equilibrium prediction is calculated without any parameters. We
therefore can not conclude that one of the two models is better.
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Log-likelihood CH -63956 -36390 -23716 -20546 -20255 -19748 -18083
Proportion below CH (%) 61.08 72.50 77.69 79.87 81.86 82.63 81.94
Proportion below eq. (%) 49.56 61.82 67.66 67.70 70.23 76.79 76.61
The proportion below the theoretical prediction refers to the fraction of the empirical density that
lies below the theoretical prediction.
Table 3: Goodness-of-t for cognitive hierarchy and equilibrium for eld data
The players tendency to embrace or avoid particular numbers is more di¢ cult to
explain using general formal models. As was shown in Table 1, players seem to have pref-
erences for odd numbers, numbers that represent round-numbered years, and repeating
same-digit strings, whereas they avoid numbers divisible by 10 and even numbers. In
the CH approach, the natural way to model this is to assume that 0-step thinkers do
not choose randomly, but they instead choose using simple low-e¤ort heuristics, including
prominent numbers. One-step thinkers then correctly avoid these numbers and choose
anti-focal numbers (e.g. avoiding numbers that are multiples of 10). It is hard to explain
these choices parametrically without some theory of what makes certain choices focal or
anti-focal, so we simply note this tendency and leave a deeper understanding to future
research. Note however that Crawford and Iriberri (2007) use a CH approach to explain
similar patterns in simpler hide-and-seek games. In their games the number of strategies
is small, so the strategies which are not focal (in a graphical display) are typically anti-
focal. With the large number of strategies in our games the same approach does not work
so neatly (e.g., avoid the numbers 10 and 20 do not necessarily point to the choices of 11
and 22, neither than 16 or 28).
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4 The Laboratory LUPI Game
The rules of the eld LUPI game do not exactly match the theoretical assumptions used
to generate the predicted equilibrium described above. The eld data included some
choices made by a random number generator and some players might have chosen mul-
tiple numbers or simply colluded. It is possible that these features can account for the
discrepancies between the data and the equilibrium prediction. We then took the natural
next step, playing the LUPI game in a controlled laboratory environment which more
closely matches the assumptions of the theory.
In designing the laboratory game, we compromise between two goals: to create a
simple environment in which theory should apply (theoretical validity), and to recreate
the features of the eld LUPI game in the lab. Because we use this opportunity to
create an experimental protocol that is closely matched to a particular eld setting, we
sometimes sacriced theoretical validity for eld replication.
The rst choice is the scale of the game, in number of players (N), permissible numbers
(K), and stakes. We choose to scale down the number of players and the largest payo¤
by a factor of roughly 2000. This implies that there were on average of 26.9 players and
the prize to the winner in each round was $7, whereas we used K = 99.21 Since the
eld data span 49 days, the experiment has 49 rounds in each session. (We typically
refer to experimental rounds as daysand seven-dayintervals as weeksfor semantic
comparability between the lab and eld descriptions.) While the winning number was
announced in each eld-game day, we do not know how much subjects learned about the
number distribution (which was only available online); thus, we choose to announce only
the winning number in the lab.
Because the number of players is endogenous in the eld, in the lab experiment the
number of players in each round was also determined randomly. In two sessions, we scaled
down the empirical distribution of number of bets in the eld as in the 49 days by 2000,
then re-scaled it so that the mean equals the variance (both are 26.9), consistent with
a Poisson distribution. In a third session, we used a Poisson distribution with a mean
of 26.9 players to generate the numbers of players. Because players in the eld did not
necessarily know the number of players, we did not tell the lab subjects the process by
which the number of players in each round was determined. This is an example of how
the design opted for lab-eld parallelism at the expense of theoretical validity.
In contrast to the eld game, each player was allowed to choose only one number and
there was only one prize per round, in the amount of $7. There was no option to use
21Rescaling by 2000 would lead to a range from 1 to K = 50, but we used K = 99 since we worried
that we otherwise would miss the chance to see some focal numbers like 66 and 88.
18
a random number generator and in the case there was no number that only one player
picked, nobody won in that round. These rules implement theoretical assumptions but
depart from the rules in the eld game.
Three laboratory sessions were conducted at the California Social Science Experi-
mental Laboratory (CASSEL) at University of California Los Angeles on the 22nd and
25th of March 2007. The experiments were conducted using the Zürich Toolbox for
Ready-made Economic Experiments (zTree) developed by Urs Fischbacher, as described
in Fischbacher (2007). Within each session, 38 graduate and undergraduate students were
recruited, through CASSELs web-based recruiting system, to participate. All subjects
had the knowledge that their payo¤ will be determined by their performance. We made
no attempt to replicate the demographics of the eld data, which we unfortunately know
very little about. However, the players in the laboratory are likely to di¤er in terms of
gender, age and ethnicity compared to the Swedish players. In all three sessions, we had
more female than male subjects, with all of them clustered in the age bracket of 18 to
22, and the majority spoke a second language. The majority of the subjects had never
participated in any form of lottery before. According to subjectsself-perceived income
group, roughly half indicated that they were below the 50th percentile.22 Subjects had
various levels of exposure to game theory, but very few had seen or heard of a similar
game prior to this experiment.
4.1 Experimental Procedure
At the beginning of each session, the experimenter rst explained the rules of the LUPI
game. The instructions were based on a version of the lottery ticket for the eld game
translated from Swedish to English (see Appendix D). Subjects were then given the option
of leaving the experiment, in order to see how much self-selection inuences experimental
generalizability. None of the recruited subjects chose to leave, which indicates a limited
role for self-selection (after recruitment and instruction).
After having received everyones consent, the experiment continued. In order to avoid
an end-game e¤ect, subjects were told that the experiment would end at a predeter-
mined, but non-disclosed time (also matching the eld setting, which ended abruptly and
unexpectedly). Subjects were told that participation was randomly determined at the
beginning of each round, with 26.9 subjects participating on average. In the beginning of
each round, subjects were informed whether they would participate in the current round.
22Subjects were asked to report their household income percentile. Since we were interested in how
the subjects perceived themselves, we purposely did not dene the size of household, whether counting
themselves as independent head of household or as a dependent of their parentshousehold. Along the
same line of reasoning, we did not provide subjects with the current national income distribution.
19
They were required to submit a number in each round, even if they were not selected to
participate. (The di¤erence between behavior of selected and non-selected players gives
us some information about the e¤ect of marginal incentives.)
When all subjects had submitted numbers, the lowest unique positive integer was
determined. If there was a lowest unique positive integer, the winner earned $7. Each
subject was privately informed, immediately after each round, what the winning number
was, whether they had won that particular round, and their payo¤ so far during the
experiment. This procedure was repeated 49 times, with no practice rounds (as is the case
of the eld). After the last round, subjects were asked to complete a short questionnaire
which allowed us to build the demographics of our subjects and a classication of strategies
used. In one of the sessions, we included the cognitive reection test as a way to measure
cognitive ability (to be described below). All sessions lasted for less than an hour, and
subjects received a show-up fee of $8 or $13 in addition to prizes from the experiment
(which averaged $8.6).
Screenshots from the experiment are shown in Appendix D.
4.2 Lab Descriptive Statistics
Behavior in the laboratory di¤ers slightly among the three sessions. We cannot reject
that the two sessions that used the scaled down eld distribution of number of players are
di¤erent (the p-value using a Mann-Whitney test is 0:44), but the session that follows an
actual Poisson distribution is statistically di¤erent from the pooled data from the other
two sessions (Mann-Whitney p-value 0:009). However, if we only use the choices of players
who were selected to participate in each round, we cannot reject that the distribution of
the data is the same in all sessions at p < 0:05.23
In the remainder of the paper, we therefore pool the data from all three sessions, but
only use the choices of participating subjects. It should be noted, however, that we cannot
reject that participating and non-participating playersbehavior di¤er when pooling data
from all sessions (Mann-Whitney p-value 0:16). Figure 10 displays the aggregate data
from non-selected and selected subjectschoices. Subjects are slightly more likely to play
high numbers above 20 when they are not selected to participate, but overall the pattern
looks very similar. This implies that subjectsbehavior in a particular round is almost
una¤ected depending on whether they had marginal monetary incentives or not.
23Using only selected playerschoices, a Mann-Whitney test of the null hypothesis that the two sessions
with the eld distribution are the same results in a p-value of 0.22. Separately comparing the Poisson
session with the two sessions with the eld distribution of players result in p-values of 0.06 and 0.46.
Comparing the session with the Poisson distribution with the pooled data from the two sessions with the
eld distribution results in a p-value of 0.13.
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Figure 11 shows the data for the choices of participating players. There are very few
numbers above 20 and we therefore focus on the numbers 1 to 20 in the following graphs.
In line with the eld data, players have a predilection for certain numbers, while others
are avoided. Judging from Figure 11, subjects avoid some even numbers, especially 2 and
10, while they endorse the odd (and prime) numbers 3, 11, 13 and 17. Interestingly, no
subject played 20, while 19 was played ve times and 21 was played six times.
All rounds R 1-7 R. 4349 Eq.
Avg. Std.dev. Min Max Avg. Avg. Avg.
Average number played 5.7 1.6 4.2 13.1 9.0 5.3 5.2
Median number played 4.8 1.0 3.5 8.0 6.0 5.0 5
Below 20 (%) 98.13 3.43 78.05 100.00 92.81 98.83 1.00
Even numbers (%) 44.07 5.84 29.47 56.94 39.79 47.16 46.86
Session 1 (Field dist.)
Winning number 6.0 9.3 1 67 13.0 2.5 2.9
Lowest number not played 8.1 2.5 1 12 4.9 8.1 3.3
Session 2 (Poisson dist.)
Winning number 5.1 2.6 1 10 5.8 5.1 2.9
Lowest number not played 7.5 2.9 1 12 6.3 8.4 3.3
Session 3 (Field dist.)
Winning number 5.6 3.2 1 14 6.1 5.7 2.9
Lowest number not played 7.5 2.7 2 13 7.4 10.0 3.3
Summary statistics are based only on choices of subjects that are selected to participate. The
equilibrium column refers to what would result if all players played according to equilibrium (n = 26:9
and K = 99)
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for laboratory data
Table 4 shows some descriptive statistics for the participating subjects in the lab
experiment. As in the eld, some players in the rst week tend to pick very high numbers.
In the rst week, 93 percent of all numbers are below 20 (7 percent above 20), while only
one percent chose above 20 in the last week. The average number chosen in the last
week corresponds closely to the equilibrium prediction (5.3 vs. 5.2) and the medians are
identical (5.0). The average winning numbers are too high compared to equilibrium play,
which is consistent with the observation that players pick very low numbers too much,
creating non-uniqueness among those numbers so that unique numbers are high. The
tendency to pick odd numbers decreases over time 40 percent of all numbers are even
in the rst week, whereas 47 percent are even in the last week (which coincides with the
equilibrium proportion of even numbers).
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4.3 Aggregate Results
In the Poisson equilibrium with 26.9 average number of players, strictly positive prob-
ability is put on numbers 1 to 16, while other numbers have probabilities numerically
indistinguishable from zero. Figure 12 shows the average frequencies played in week 1 to
7 together with the equilibrium prediction (dashed line) and the estimated week-by-week
results using the cognitive hierarchy model (solid line). These graphs clearly indicates
that learning is quicker in the laboratory than in the eld. Despite that the only feedback
given to players in each round is the winning number, behavior is remarkably close to equi-
librium already in the second week. However, we can also observe the same discrepancies
between the equilibrium prediction and observed behavior as in the eld. The distribution
of numbers is too spiky and there is overshooting of low numbers and undershooting at
numbers just below the equilibrium cuto¤.
Figure 12 also displays the estimates from a maximum likelihood estimation of the
cognitive hierarchy model presented in the theoretical section (solid line). The cognitive
hierarchy model can account both for the spikes and the over- and undershooting. Table
5 shows the estimated parameters.24 There is no clear time trend in the two parameters,
and in some rounds the average number of thinking steps is unreasonably large compared
to other experiments showing  around 1.5. Since there are two free parameters with
relatively few choice probabilities to estimate, we might be over-tting by allowing two
free parameters. We therefore estimate the precision parameter  while keeping the
average number of thinking steps xed. We set the average number of thinking steps to
1:5, which has been shown to be a value of  that predicts experimental data well in a large
number of games (Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2004). The estimated precision parameter
is considerably lower in the rst week, but is then relatively constant. Figure 13 shows
the tted cognitive hierarchy model when  is restricted to 1:5. It is clear that the model
with  = 1:5 can account for the undershooting also when the number of thinking steps
is xed, but it has di¢ culties in explaining the overshooting of low numbers. The main
problem is that with  = 1:5, there are too many zero-step thinkers that play all numbers
between 1 and 99 with uniform probability.
Table 5 also displays the maximum likelihood estimate of  for the logit QRE. The
precision parameter is relatively high in all weeks, but particularly from the second week
and onwards. Recall from Figure 2 that the QRE prediction for such high  is very close
to the Poisson-Nash equilibrium.
Table 6 provides some goodness-of-t statistics for the cognitive hierarchy model, QRE
and the equilibrium prediction. The table reveals that the cognitive hierarchy estimations
24The log-likelihood function is neither smooth nor concave, so the estimated parameters may not
reect a global maximum of the likelihood.
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Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 8.15 13.14 6.48 5.31 11.52 5.05 9.00
 1.19 11.27 10.85 14.92 13.53 14.67 8.73
 ( = 1:5) 1.08 2.37 2.85 2.82 2.76 2.34 2.16
QRE 123.40 526.83 396.24 430.83 523.30 517.25 309.89
Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimation of the cognitive hierarchy model and QRE for
laboratory data
t the data better after the rst week. Comparing the proportion of correctly predicted
choices, the equilibrium prediction does remarkably well. The equilibrium prediction does
better than the cognitive hierarchy model with  = 1:5 in all weeks, but the cognitive
hierarchy model with two free parameters does better than the equilibrium prediction in all
but the second week. Allowing for noise, the logit QRE performs better than equilibrium
in the rst week, but is practically indistinguishable from equilibrium after the rst week
(due to high ). Since the logit QRE includes the Poisson equilibrium as a special case
(when  ! 1), the log-likelihood of the logit QRE provides an upper bound for that
of the Poisson-Nash equilibrium. Hence, comparing the log-likelihood of logit QRE and
cognitive hierarchy, we also see that the Poisson-Nash equilibrium (using logit QRE as
bound) out-performs the cognitive hierarchy model with  = 1:5, but is out-performed by
the cognitive hierarchy model with two free parameters.
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Log-likelihood CH -150.9 -75.9 -67.5 -65.0 -64.4 -60.7 -68.5
Log-likelihood CH  = 1:5 -204.1 -180.8 -171.6 -179.8 -177.8 -178.4 -185.8
Log-likelihood logit QRE -172.2 -76.8 -94.8 -88.5 -82.0 -76.9 -88.9
Proportion below CH (%) 86.06 88.02 92.26 93.13 91.41 94.99 92.60
Proportion below CH  = 1:5 (%) 81.11 76.53 79.00 76.79 78.23 76.22 77.18
Proportion below logit QRE (%) 84.95 87.94 83.64 86.88 86.13 90.21 86.61
Proportion below eq. (%) 81.71 88.16 83.60 87.19 86.13 90.79 86.88
The proportion below the theoretical prediction refers to the fraction of the empirical density that lies
below the theoretical prediction.
Table 6: Goodness-of-t for cognitive hierarchy, QRE and equilibrium for laboratory data
On the aggregate level, behavior in the lab is remarkably close to equilibrium from the
second to the last week. The cognitive hierarchy model can rationalize the tendencies that
some numbers are played more, as well as the undershooting below the equilibrium cuto¤.
The value-added of the cognitive hierarchy model is not primarily that it gives a slightly
better t, but that it provides a plausible story for how players manage to play so close
to equilibrium. Most likely, few players would be capable of calculating the equilibrium
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during the course of the experiment, whereas many of them should be able to carry out
a few steps of reasoning along the lines of the cognitive hierarchy model.
4.4 Individual Results
Behavior on the aggregate level is close to equilibrium, which is particularly remarkable
since subjects received very little feedback during the experiment (only the winning num-
bers). In the post-experimental questionnaire, several subjects said that they responded
to previous winning numbers, so we regressed playerschoices on the winning number in
previous periods. Table 7 shows that the winning numbers in previous rounds do a¤ect
playerschoices early on. In the rst and second weeks, if the winning number was high,
players tend to choose higher numbers in the next round. However, this tendency is con-
siderably weaker in later weeks 3-7. The small round coe¢ cients in Table 7 also show
that there does not appear to be any general trend in playerschoices over the 49 rounds.
All periods Week 1 Week 2 Week 3-7
Round (1-49) -0.011 -0.529 -0.102 0.0144
(-1.09) (-0.58) (-0.47) (1.10)
t  1 winner 0:188 0:154 0:376 0:089
(10.55) (3.55) (2.20) (1.98)
t  2 winner 0:140 0:111 0.323 0.056
(7.43) (1.99) (1.28) (1.26)
t  3 winner 0:082 0.078 -0.057 0.036
(4.10) (1.13) (-0.26) (0.83)
Fixed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3156 319 483 2354
R2 0.05 0.12 0.01 0.00
*=5 percent and **=1 percent signicance level. The table report
results from a linear xed e¤ects panel regression. Only selected
subjects are included. t statistics within parentheses.
Table 7: Panel data regressions explaining individual play in the laboratory
The regression results in Table 7 mask a considerably degree of heterogeneity between
individual subjects. In the post-experimental questionnaire, we asked people to state why
they played as they did. Based on these responses we coded four variables depending on
whether they mentioned each aspect as a motivation for their strategy.
Random All subjects who claimed that they played numbers randomly were coded in
this category.25
25For example, one subject motivated this strategy choice in a particular sophisticated way: First I
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Stick All subjects who stated that they stuck to one number throughout parts of the
experiment were included in this category. Many of these subjects explained their
choices by arguing that if they stuck with the same number, they would increase
the probability of winning.
Lucky This category includes all subjects who claimed that they played a favorite or
lucky number.
Strategic This category includes all players who explicitly motivated their strategy by
referring to what the other players would do.26
Several subjects were coded into more than one category.27 The fraction of subjects
within each set of categories are reported in Table 8.
(%) Random Stick Lucky Strategic
Random 35.1 7.0 1.8 7.0
Stick 34.2 3.5 15.8
Lucky 10.5 4.4
Strategic 41.2
Table 8: Classication of self-reported strategies
How well does the classication based on the self-reported strategies explain behavior?
Table 9 reports regressions where the dependent variables are four summary statistics of
subjectsbehavior the number of distinct choices, the mean number, the standard devi-
ation of number, and the total payo¤. In the rst column for each measure of individual
play only the four categories above are included as dummy variables. There are few
statistically signicant relationships. Subjects coded into the Stickcategory did tend
to choose fewer numbers, and subjects coded as Luckytend to pick higher and more
highly varied numbers (high standard deviation). Table 9 also report regressions for
the same dependent variables and some demographic variables.28 The only statistically
tried logic, one number up or down, how likely was it that someone else would pick that, etc. That wasnt
doing any good, as someone else was probably doing the exact same thing. So I started mentally singing
scales, and whatever number I was on in my head I typed in. This made it rather random. A couple of
times I just threw curveballs from nowhere for the hell of it. I didnt pay any attention to whether or
not I was selected to play that round after the rst 3 or so.
26For example, one subject stated the following: I tried to pick numbers that I thought other people
wouldnt think of whatever my rst intuition was, I went against. Then I went against my second
intuition, then picked my number. After awhile, I just used the same # for the entire thing.
27For example, the following subject was classied into all but the Luckycategory: At rst I picked
4 for almost all rounds (stick) because it isnt considered to be a popular number like 3 and 5 (strategic).
Afterwards, I realized that it wasnt helping so I picked random numbers (random).
28Including demographic variables and the four categories in the same regressions does not a¤ect any
of the results reported here.
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signicant relationship is that subjects familiar with game theory tend to pick lower and
less dispersed numbers (though their payo¤s are not higher). Note that the explanatory
power is very low and that there are no signicant coe¢ cients in the regressions on the
total payo¤ from the experiment. This suggests that it is hard to a¤ect the payo¤ by
using a particular strategy, which is consistent with the fully mixed equilibrium (where
payo¤s are the same for all strategies).
# Distinct Mean Std. dev. Payo¤
Random 0.529 -0.12 -0.93 -1.97
(0.97) (-0.23) (-0.85) (-1.37)
Stick  1:14 -0.43 -1.62 -0.65
(-2.19) (-0.86) (-1.55) (-0.48)
Lucky 0.79 2:00 3:22 0.39
(1.01) (2.64) (2.04) (0.19)
Strategic 0.33 -0.40 -1.04 0.24
(0.64) (-0.81) (-1.00) (0.18)
Age -0.19 -0.05 -0.03 0.34
(-0.23) (-0.59) (-0.20) (1.60)
Female -0.09 -0.37 -1.17 -0.39
(-0.19) (-0.79) (-1.19) (-0.31)
Income (1-4) -0.33 -0.06 -0.37 0.53
(-1.30) (-0.25) (-0.72) (0.81)
Lottery player 0.05 -0.24 -0.00 -0.17
(0.10) (-0.50) (-0.00) (-0.13)
Game theory -0.04  1:17  2:09 -0.89
(-0.08) (-2.43) (-2.08) (-0.68)
R2 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.03
Obs. 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113
Only selected choices are included in the calculation of the dependent variables. t statistics within
parentheses. Constant included in all regressions. *=5 percent and **=1 percent signicance level.
Table 9: Linear regressions explaining individual behavior
Figure 14 shows a histogram of the number of distinct numbers that subjects played
during the experiments. Based only on choices when players were selected to participate,
subjects played on average 9.46 di¤erent numbers. Only one subject played the same
number in all rounds.
The questionnaire in one of the sessions also contained the three-question Cognitive
Reection Test (CRT) developed by Frederick (2005).29 The purpose with collecting
subjectsresponses to the CRT is to get some measure of cognitive ability. In line with the
29The CRT consists of three questions, all of which would have an instinctive answer, and a counterin-
tuitive, but correct, answer. See Frederick (2005) or the screenshot in Appendix D for the questions that
we used.
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results reported in Frederick (2005), a majority of the UCLA subjects answered only zero
or one questions correctly. Interestingly, there does not appear to any relation between
players behavior or payo¤ in the LUPI game and the number of correctly answered
questions, but the sample size is small (n=38). The number of correctly answered CRT
questions is not signicant when the four measures in Table 9 are regressed on the CRT
score.
5 Field vs. Lab
Throughout the history of experimental economics, there has been a simmering debate
about the extent to which laboratory experiments can tell us something about partic-
ular naturally-occurring situations outside the lab (e.g., Loewenstein, 1999). There are
at least two concerns related to this argument. First, to what extent do the often ab-
stract and highly structured games used in laboratory experiments represent phenomena
in real-world settings? Second, to what extent do laboratory subjectsbehavior dif-
fer from humans in non-laboratory settings, for example because the subject pool is not
representative or due to experimenter e¤ects. In this paper, we address both these con-
cerns. The laboratory experiment in this paper uses the same game with a few minor
modications as the game played in the eld. The lab and eld LUPI games di¤er, how-
ever, in time, location, context and demographics of the players. In the eld LUPI game,
players are self-selected from the Swedish population and play with their own money in
a naturally occurring environment. Students at UCLA on the opposite side of the globe
play as experimental subjects in a scrutinized laboratory setting.
Despite these di¤erences, behavior in the laboratory and the eld show striking sim-
ilarities. Players in both the eld and laboratory learn to play the game remarkably
close to the Poisson equilibrium. The over- and undershooting and special-number dis-
crepancies between their behavior and the equilibrium predictions are also similar. This
forcefully demonstrates how economic theory bridges the eld and the lab, as well as the
power of experiments which are created to have crucial features of particular eld settings
to produce parallel behavior.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies a new game, LUPI, in which the lowest unique positive integer wins a
xed prize. The game has similarities with both congestion games (Rosenthal, 1973) and
numerical beauty-contestgames (Nagel, 1995), but it is distinct from both. LUPI is a
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close relative to auctions in which the lowest unique bid wins, but ignores that the size of
the prize depends on the bid and complications arising from private valuations.
We characterized the Poisson-Nash equilibrium and analyzed peoples behavior in this
game using both an unusually clear eld data set including more than 2.6 million choices,
and parallel laboratory experiments. Despite the di¤erences in context, location and
participating players between the eld and laboratory, we nd that the behavior of the
lottery-playing public in Sweden in a naturally occurring setting is very similar to the
behavior of UCLA students in a laboratory environment.
In both the eld and lab, players quickly learn to play close to equilibrium, but there
are some remaining discrepancies between playersbehavior and equilibrium predictions.
These discrepancies can to some extent be accounted for by a cognitive hierarchy model
with quantal responses. These ndings demonstrate the remarkable force of traditional
equilibrium analysis. Complex computations produce precise predictions about a sharp
dropo¤ in strategies, around 5513 in the eld data and 14 in the lab data. Choices do drop
o¤ sharply, but drop o¤ below the equilibrium dropo¤ point. The data also demonstrate
the ability of parameterized behavioral models of cognitive hierarchies to explain both why
the equilibrium prediction is such a surprisingly accurate approximation, and to explain
the regular deviations from equilibrium.
Our two major conclusions are also visible in a preliminary working paper on lowest
unique bid auctions for money and consumer goods by Eichberger and Vinogradov (2007)
(though their theory is only approximately worked out and does not use the Poisson
structure). Among inexperienced bidders there are too many low and high bids and too
few bids just below the equilibrium cuto¤. But there is learning across auctions and in
general the bid distributions are remarkably close to equilibrium. The parallelism of their
conclusions and ours suggests that what we have learned from the articial LUPI game
might also apply to naturally-occurring auctions and perhaps other economic settings.
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Appendix [For referees and online availability only]
A. The Symmetric Fixed-n Nash Equilibrium
Let there be a nite number of n players that each pick an integer between 1 and K.
If there are numbers that are only chosen by one player, then the player that picks the
lowest such number wins a prize, which we normalize to 1, and all other players get zero.
If there is no number that only one player chooses, everybody gets zero.
To get some intuition for the equilibrium in the game with many players, we rst
consider the cases with two and three players. If there are only two players and two
numbers to choose from, the game reduces to the following bimatrix game.
1 2
1 0; 0 1; 0
2 0; 1 0; 0
This game has three equilibria. There are two asymmetric equilibria in which one player
picks 1 and the other player picks 2, and one symmetric equilibrium in which both players
pick 1.
Now suppose that there are three players and three numbers to choose from (i.e.,
n = K = 3). In any pure strategy equilibrium it must be the case that at least one player
plays the number 1, but not more than two players play the number 1 (if all three play
1, it is optimal to deviate for one player and pick 2). In pure strategy equilibria where
only one player plays 1, the other players can play in any combination of the other two
numbers. In pure strategy equilibria where two players play 1, the third player plays
2. In total there are 18 pure strategy equilibria. To nd the symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium, let p1 denote the probability with which 1 is played and p2 the probability
with which 2 is played. The expected payo¤ from playing the pure strategies if the other
two players randomize is given by
 (1) = (1  p1)2 ;
 (2) =

(1  p1   p2)2 + p21

;
 (3) =

p21 + p
2
2

:
Setting the payo¤ from the three pure strategies yields p1 = 2
p
3   3 = 0:464 and p2 =
p3 = 2 
p
3 = 0:268.
In the game with n players, there are numerous asymmetric pure strategy equilibria
as in the three-player case. For example, in one type of equilibrium exactly one player
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picks 1 and the other players pick the other numbers in arbitrary ways. In order to nd
symmetric mixed strategy equilibria, let pk denote the probability put on number k.30
In a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, the distribution of guesses will follow the
multinomial distribution. The probability of x1 players guessing 1, x2 players guessing 2
and so on is given by
f (x1; :::; xK ;n) =
(
n!
x1!xK !p
x1
1    pxKK if
PK
i=1 xi = n,
0 otherwise,
where we use the convention that 00 = 1 in case any of the numbers is picked with zero
probability. The marginal density function for the kth number is the binomial distribution
fk (xk;n) =
n!
xk! (n  xk)!p
xk
k (1  pk)n xk :
Let gk (x1; x2; :::; xk;n) denote the marginal distribution for the rst k numbers. In other
words, we dene gk for k < K as
gk (x1; x2; :::; xk;n) =
X
xk+1+xk+2++xK=n (x1+x2++xk)
n!
x1!x2!   xK !p
x1
1 p
x2
2    pxKK :
Using the multinomial theorem we can simplify this to31
gk (x1; x2; :::; xk;n) =
n!
x1!   xk!p
x1
1    pxkk
(pk+1 + pk+2 +   + pK)n (x1+x2++xk)
(n  (x1 + x2 +   + xk))! :
If k = K, then gk (x1; x2; :::; xk;n) = f (x1; x2; :::; xk;n). Finally, let hk (n) denote the
probability that nobody guessed k and there is at least one number between 1 to k   1
that only one player guessed. This probability is given by (again if k < K)
hk (n) =
X
(x1;:::;xk 1): some xi=1
& x1++xk 1n
gk (x1; x2; :::; xk 1; 0;n) :
30We have not been able to show that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, but when numerically
solving for a symmetric equilibrium we have not found any other equilibria than the ones reported
below. Existence of a symmetric equilibrium is guaranteed since players have nite strategy sets. (A
straightforward extension of Proposition 1.5 in Weibull, 1995 shows that all symmetric normal form games
with nite number of strategies and players have a symmetric equilibrium.)
31The multinomial theorem states that the following holds
(p1 + p2 +   + pK)n =
X
x1+x2++xK=n
n!
x1!x2!   xK !p
x1
1 p
x2
2    pxKK ;
given that all xi  0.
30
If k = K, then this probability is given by
hK (n) =
X
(x1;:::;xk 1): some xi=1
& x1++xk 1=n
f (x1; x2; :::; xK 1; 0;n) :
The probability of winning when guessing 1 and all other players follow the symmetric
mixed strategy is given by
 (1) = f1 (0;n  1) = (1  p1)n 1 :
The probability of winning when playing 1 < k < K is given by32
 (k) = fk (0;n  1)  hk (n  1) ;
= (1  pk)n 1   hk (n  1) :
Similarly, the probability of winning when playing k = K is given by
 (K) = fK (0;n  1)  hK (n  1) .
In a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, the probability of winning from all pure
strategies in the support of the equilibrium must be the same. In the special case when
n = K and all numbers are played with positive probability, we can simply solve the
system of K   2 equations where each equation is
(1  pk)n 1   hk (n  1) = (1  p1)n 1 ;
32The easiest way to see this is to draw a Venn diagram. More formally, let A = fNo other player picks
kg and let B = fNo number below k is uniqueg, so that P (A) = fk (0;n  1) and P (B) = hk (n  1).
We want to determine P (A \B), which is equal to
P (A \B) = P (A) + P (B)  P (A [B).
To determine P (A [B), note that it can be written as the union between two independent events
P (A [B) = P (B [ (B0 \A)) :
Since B and B0 \A are independent,
P (A [B) = P (B) + P (B0 \A):
Combining this with the expression for P (A \B) we get
P (A \B) = P (A)  P (A \B0).
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for all 2 < k < K and the Kth equation
(1  pK)n 1   hK (n  1) = (1  p1)n 1 :
In principle, it is straightforward to solve this system numerically. However, computing
the hk function is computationally explosive because it requires the summation over a large
set of vectors of length k 1. The number of combinations explodes as n and K gets large
and it is non-trivial to solve for equilibrium for more than 8 players. As an illustration,
when n = K = 7, h7(6) involves the summation over 391 vectors, and when n = K = 8
computing h8 (7) involves 1520 vectors. To understand the magnitude of the complexity,
suppose we want to compute hK (n  1). This involves the summation over all vectors
(x1; :::; xK 1) such that some xi = 1 and x1 +    + xK 1 = n   1. Only a small subset
of all these vectors are the ones where x1 = 1. How many such vectors are there? For
those vectors there must be n  2 players that play numbers x2; :::; xK 1, i.e., potentially
K   2 di¤erent strategies. The total number of such vectors are
(K + n  5)!
(n  2)!(K   3)! ;
where we have used the fact that the number of sequences of n natural numbers that sum
to k is (n + k   1)!=(k!(n  1)!). For example, when n = 27 and K = 99, the number of
vectors in which x1 = 1 is larger than 1025. Note that this number is much lower than
the actual total number of vectors since we have only counted vectors such that x1 = 1.
Assuming n = K, the table below show the equilibrium for up to eight players.
3x3 4x4 5x5 6x6 7x7 8x8
1 0:4641 0:4477 0:3582 0:3266 0:2946 0:2710
2 0:2679 0:4249 0:3156 0:2975 0:2705 0:2512
3 0:2679 0:1257 0:1918 0:2314 0:2248 0:2176
4 0:0017 0:0968 0:1225 0:1407 0:1571
5 0:0376 0:0216 0:0581 0:0822
6 0:0005 0:0110 0:0199
7 0:0004 0:0010
8 0:0000
Note that these probabilities are close to the Poisson equilibrium reported in the text
(all probabilities above 5x5 are within 0.02).
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B. Computational and Estimation Issues
This appendix provides details about the numerical computations and estimations that are
reported in the paper. We have used MATLAB 7.4.0 for all computations and estimations.
Both the data and all MATLAB programs that have been used for the paper can be
obtained from the authors upon request.
Poisson Equilibrium
The Poisson equilibrium was computed in MATLAB through iteration of the equilibrium
condition (1).
Fixed-n Equilibrium
To compute the equilibrium when the number of players is xed and commonly known,
we programmed the functions fk; fK ; hk and hK in MATLAB and then solved the system
of equations characterizing equilibrium using MATLABs solver fsolve. However, the hk
function includes the summation of a large number of vectors. For high k and n the
number of di¤erent vectors involved in the summation grows explosively and we only
managed solve for equilibrium for up to 8 players.
Cognitive Hierarchy with Quantal Response
Calculating the cognitive hierarchy prediction for a given  and  is straightforward.
However, the cognitive hierarchy prediction is non-monotonic in  and , implying that
the log-likelihood function isnt generally smooth.
In order to calculate the log-likelihood, we assume that all players play according
to the same aggregate cognitive hierarchy prediction, i.e., the log-likelihood function is
calculated using the multinomial distribution as if all players played the same strategy.
For the eld data, we calculated the log-likelihood for the daily average frequency for
each week, but the frequency was rounded to integers in order to be able to calculate
the log-likelihood. For the lab data, we instead calculated the log-likelihood by summing
the frequencies for each week since we didnt want unnecessary estimation errors due to
rounding o¤ to integers.
Maximum likelihood estimation for the eld data is computationally demanding so we
used a relatively coarse two-dimensional grid search. We used a 20x20 grid and restricted
 to be between 0:05 and 12, and restricted  to be between 0:0001 and 0:05. We tried
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wider bounds on the parameters as well, but that didnt change the results. The log-
likelihood function is shown in Figure A5. The log-likelihood appears relatively smooth,
but since we have been forced to use a very coarse grid we might not have found the
global maximum.
For the maximum likelihood estimation of the lab data, we used a two-dimensional
300x300 grid search. We tried di¤erent bounds on  and , then let both parameters vary
between 0:001 and 20. The two-dimensional log-likelihood function is shown in Figure A6.
It is clear that the log-likelihood function isnt smooth. There is therefore no guarantee
that we have found a global maximum, but we have tried di¤erent grid sizes and bounds
on the parameters.
When  is xed at 1:5, the maximum likelihood estimation is simpler. We used a grid
size of 300 and tried di¤erent bounds for  with unchanged results. The log-likelihood
function for  = 0:001 to  = 100 from the rst week is shown in Figure A7. The log-
likelihood function is not globally concave, but seems to be concave around the global
maximum, so it is likely that we have found a global maximum.
QRE
In order to calculate the QRE for a given level of , we used MATLABs solver fsolve
to solve the xed-point equation that characterizes the QRE. In the ML estimation for
the laboratory data we allowed  between 0:001 and 700. To nd the optimal value we
used a grid search with a grid size of 50. The log-likelihood function for the rst week is
shown in Figure A8. The log-likelihood function is smooth and concave, indicating that
we have are likely to have found a global maximum. In some of the cases the estimated
 is very high, in which case there might be a computational problem when calculating
the QRE. However, for such high , the QRE is practically indistinguishable from the
Poisson equilibrium anyway (as shown in Figure 2).
C. Information in the eld LUPI game
The game was heavily advertised around the days when it was launched and the main
message was that this was a new game where you should be alone with the lowest number.
The winning numbers (for the rst, second, and third prizes) were reported on TV, text-
TV and the Internet every day. In the TV programs they reported not only the winning
numbers, but also commented briey about how people had played previously.
The richest information about the history of play was given on the home page of
Svenska Spel. People could display and download the frequencies of all numbers played
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for all previous days. However, this data was presented in a raw format and therefore not
very accessible. The homepage also displayed a histogram of yesterdays guesses which
made the data easier to digest. An example of how this histogram looked is shown in
Figure A9. The homepage also showed the total number of bets that had been made so
far during the day.
The web interface for online play also contained some easily accessible information.
Besides links to the data discussed above as well as information about the rules of the
game, there were some pieces of statistics that could easily be displayed from the main
screen. The default information shown was the rst name and home town of yesterdays
rst prize winner and the number that that person guessed. By clicking on the pull-down
menu in the middle, you could also see the seven most popular guesses from yesterday.
This information was shown in the way shown in Figure A10. By moving the mouse over
the bars you can see how many people guessed that number. In this example, the most
popular number was 1234 with 85 guesses! Note that this information was not easily
available before online play was possible. From the same pull-down menu, you could also
see the total number of distinct numbers people guessed on during the last seven days.
Finally, you could display the numbers of the second- and third prize winners of yesterday.
In addition to this information, Svenska Spel also published posters (and PDF) with
summary statistics for previous rounds of the game (see Figure A11). The information
given on these posters varied slightly, but the one in Figure A11 shows the winning
numbers, the number of bets, the size of the rst prize and if there was any numbers
below the winning number that no other player chose. It also shows the average, lowest
and highest winning number, as well as the most frequently played numbers.
D. The LUPI Lab Instruction Sheet
Screenshots from the input and results screens of the laboratory experiment are shown
in Figure A12 and A13. Figure A14 shows screenshots from the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire and Figure A15 a screenshot from the CRT. Instructions for the laboratory
experiment are as follows (translated directly by author Robert Östling from the Swedish
eld instructions, but modied in order to t the laboratory game):
Instruction for Limbo33
Limbo is a game in which you choose to play a number, between 1 and 99, that you
think nobody else will play in that round. The lowest number that has been played only
once wins.
The total number of rounds will not be announced. At the beginning of each
33In order to mirror the eld game as closely as possible, we referred to the LUPI game as Limboin
the lab.
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round, the computer will indicate whether you have been selected to participate in that
round. The computer selects participating players randomly so that the average number
of participating players in each round is 26.9. Please choose a number even if you are not
selected to participate in that round.
After all participating players have selected a number, the round is closed and all bets
are checked. The lowest unique number that has been received is identied and the person
that picked that number is awarded a prize of 7$.
The winning number is reported on the screen and shown to everybody after each
round.
Prizes are paid out to you at the end of the experiment.
If you have any questions, raise your hand to get the experimenters attention.
Please be quiet during the experiment and do not talk to anybody except the experi-
menter.
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